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PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BANK MERGER ACT OF 1960
On June 11, 1965, the Senate passed and referred to the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, Senate bill 1698, which is an amendment to
the Bank Merger Act of 1960.' The first part of the amendment provides that
when the appropriate federal banking agency approves a bank merger, con-
solidation, acquisition of assets or assumption of liability under the Bank
Merger Act of 1960, it must immediately notify the United States Attorney
General of this fact. The approved transaction may not be consummated until
thirty days after the date of approval, but if an antitrust suit to enjoin the
transaction is commenced within this thirty-day period, then the transaction
may not be consummated until after the termination of this suit and then only
to the extent that it is consistent with the final judgment. When a bank
merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets or assumption of liability has been
made pursuant to this procedure, no proceeding under the antitrust laws may
thereafter be instituted concerning the approved transaction.
Abbreviated procedures are provided "when the agency finds that it must
act immediately in order to prevent the probable failure of one of the banks"
and "when an emergency exists requiring expeditious action." The Senate
reporta states that the "committee expects that these special procedures will
be used only for the most serious emergencies," but does not give examples
of what these emergencies might be. The committee is probably referring to
situations where a bank's management is incompetent, where one of the banks
is a problem bank with inadequate capital or unsound assets, or where several
banks in a small town are compelled by an over-banked situation to resort to
unsound competitive practices which may have an adverse effect upon the
condition of the banks. 3
The second part of the amendment provides that any bank merger, etc.,
involving an insured bank which has been consummated prior to the bill's
enactment
. . pursuant to the then appropriate regulatory approval or ap-
provals, State or Federal, and where the resulting bank has not been
dissolved or divided or has not effected a sale or distribution of assets
1
 S. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); The Bank Merger Act of 1960 directs the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to approve or disapprove bank mergers. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964). In reaching their decision, the federal banking agencies are
to consider banking and competitive factors. The agency which would have jurisdiction
over the merged bank is the agency charged with the decision in any given case. The
deciding agency is required to request advisory reports on the competitive factor from
the other two agencies and the Attorney General.
2 S. Rep. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
a See Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1965).
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or has not taken any other similar action pursuant to a final judg-
ment under the antitrust laws prior to the enactment of this amend-
ment, shall be exempt from the antitrust laws including the Sherman
Antitrust Act . . . and the Clayton Act. . . . 4
Senate bill 1698, as it was originally introduced in the Senate on April
5, 1965, by Senator Robertson, gave the federal banking agencies exclusive
jurisdiction over bank mergers. It provided that their authority
. . . shall be exclusive and plenary, and any banks participating in a
transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this
section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of the anti-
trust laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton
Act. . . .5
This bill would have limited the involvement of the Department of Justice
in bank mergers to the advisory report on their competitive effect required by
the Bank Merger Act of 1960. With respect to the Clayton Act, it would
have made the law on bank mergers what many Congressmen and. Senators
thought it was after the enactment of the Bank Merger Act.
While the Committee was unable to agree that the Department of Justice
and the antitrust laws should not play an important role in a proposed bank
merger, it recognized the need for immediate clarifying legislation in the con-
fused area of bank mergers and accepted S. 1698 in its present form as sub-
mitted by Senator Proxmire. The amendment now provides for a double veto
of any proposed bank merger. The appropriate federal banking agency has
the first veto under the Bank Merger Act. If the agency approves the merger,
then the Attorney General may commence an antitrust suit within thirty days
and challenge the merger in court.
I. THE Philadelphia DECISION
In 1963 the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Banks
threw the law on bank mergers into considerable confusion when it decided
that Section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to bank mergers, and that bank
mergers approved by the appropriate federal banking agency under the
Bank Merger Act of 1960 were not immune to the antitrust laws. Prior to
this time it was widely believed that bank mergers were, in effect, not covered
by Section 7 of the Clayton Act because they are invariably accomplished
through asset acquisitions. When the 1950 Congress amended section 7 by
including asset acquisitions within its coverage, the additional coverage was
literally limited to "asset acquisitions by corporations subject to the Federal
Trade Commission,"7
 and banks are not subject to the Federal Trade Com-
mission. With this interpretation in mind, the 1960 Congress enacted the
Bank Merger Act.
4
 111 Cong. Rec. 12829 (daily ed. June 11, 1965).
6
 111 Cong. Rec. 6684, 6685 (daily ed. April 5, 1965).
0 374 U.S, 321 (1963).
7 Clayton Act § 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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The Bank Merger Act of 1960, which became Section 1828(c) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, provides that:
No insured bank shall merge or consolidate with any other bank
.. . without the prior written consent (i) of the Comptroller of the
Currency if the acquiring, assuming or resulting bank is to be a
national bank or a District bank, or (ii) of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring, assuming, or result-
ing bank is to be a State member bank (except a District bank)
or (iii) of the Corporation if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting
bank is to be a nonmember insured bank (except a District bank). 8
In granting or withholding its consent, the appropriate banking agency is to
consider six banking factors° and
. .. the effect of the transaction on competition (including any
tendency toward a monopoly), and shall not approve the trans-
action unless, after considering all such factors, it finds the trans-
action to be in the public interest.l°
With the expressed purpose of achieving uniform standards, the act requires
the deciding agency before acting on a merger application to request a report
on the competitive factors involved from the Attorney General and the other
two federal banking agencies. 11
As enacted into law, the Bank Merger Act of 1960 makes the "public
interest" the controlling determination with regard to bank mergers. The
federal banking agency which is to have jurisdiction over the resulting bank
has the final judgment on allowing or disallowing the merger. While the agency
is required to request opinions on the competitive factors from the Attorney
General and the other two banking agencies, these opinions are merely ad-
visory. The final determination is to be based on a balancing of the six
banking factors against or with the competitive factors.
It is quite clear that the 1960 Congress intended bank mergers to be
governed by a balancing of the banking and the competitive factors and
did not want the competitive factor to control. The Senate report states:
The committee wants to make crystal clear its intention that the
various banking factors in any particular case may be held to out-
weigh the competitive factors, and that the competitive factors,
however favorable or unfavorable, are not, in and of themselves,
controlling on the decision. 12
The Senate defeated an amendment introduced by Senator O'Mahoney which
8 The Bank Merger Act, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
9 The six factors are (1) the financial history and condition of each of the banks
involved, (2) the adequacy of its capital structure, (3) its future earnings prospects,
(4) the general character of its management, (.5) the convenience and needs of the
community to be served and (6) whether or not its corporate powers are consistent
witht Ibid.hepurposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Ibid.l
11 Ibid.
12 S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959).
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would have made the competitive factor controlling and which would have
provided for hearings and appeal by adversely affected parties and the
Attorney Genera1.13 The Senate and House debates give a clear indication
that the competitive factor not only should not be controlling, but also
that the competitive factor may be outweighed by the banking factors in
the prescribed public interest determination by the banking agency.14
These same debates indicate that Congress intended that the federal
banking agency's decision on a proposed bank merger should control. The
Senators and Congressmen speak of providing "effective control by the
Federal banking agencies over all bank mergers under Federal jurisdiction,"' 5
of not needing "procedures which would make litigation ensue in almost
every case of a bank merger with respect to which the Attorney General
disapproved,"16 and of placing the "responsibility for acting on a proposed
merger" in the agency which will supervise and examine the resulting bank."
The Senate report on S. 1698 states that at the time the Bank Merger Act
was passed, "it was clearly expected that the decision of the responsible
Federal banking authority ... would be final and conclusive." 18
The Supreme Court in the Philadelphia case decided that when the 1950
Congress amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act by adding "asset acquisi-
tions by corporations subject to the Federal Trade Commission," it did not
intend a literal interpretation. Supposedly, the 1950 Congress intended to
bring all mergers of any type within the provisions of section 7 and intended
the specific exemption for asset acquiring corporations not subject to the
FTC's jurisdiction to apply only to asset acquisitions not accompanied by
merger.'" Having held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to bank
mergers, the Court went on to note that the Bank Merger Act confers no
express immunity to antitrust laws, that the Bank Merger Act was predicated
upon the uncertainty as to the scope of section 7 and that the committee
reports and the Senate debate indicate that the act was not intended to affect
the applicability of the antitrust laws to bank acquisitions." The Supreme
Court concluded by stating:
[']n holding as we do that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 does not
preclude application of § 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers, we
deprive the later statute of none of its intended force. 2 '
It is true that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 does not confer express
immunity from the antitrust laws on bank mergers, but when the act was
19
 105 Cong. Rec. 7691, 7692 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
14
 105 Cong. Rec. 8074, 8075-76 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson) ; 106 Cong.
Rec. 7256, 7258-59, 9710, 9711-12 (1960) (remarks of Representative Brown, Representa-
tive Muller and Senator Fulbright).
15 105 Cong. Rec. 8074, 8077 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson); 106 Cong.
Rec. 7256, 7257 (1960) (remarks of Representative Spense).
10 105 Cong. Rec. 8125, 8129 (1959) (remarks of Senator javits).
17
 106 Cong. Rec. 7256, 7257 (1960) (remarks of Representative Brown).
18 S. Rep. No. 299, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19
 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 6, at 342.
20 Id. at 350-52.
21 Id. at 354.
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passed, there seemed to be little reason for such an exemption. The Senate
report clearly states that the act "would not affect in any way the applica-
bility of the Sherman Act to bank mergers or consolidations."22 With reference
to the Clayton Act, the report states that asset acquisitions were included
within Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 but only in the case of corpora-
tions subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. Banks,
being subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board for purposes
of the Clayton Act by virtue of section 11 of the act, were not affected 23
As bank mergers are customarily, if not always, carried out by means of asset
acquisition, they are exempt from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 24 Since
the Congress was certain that the Clayton Act was not applicable to
bank mergers as they are invariably accomplished, there was no reason
to include an express exemption as it had done in other acts. While the
Supreme Court correctly states that the Congress of 1960 did not accurately
anticipate the Philadelphia decision, this does not mean that it did not
intend to immunize bank mergers. Senator Robertson, the act's sponsor, did
say that the application of the antitrust laws to bank mergers was not altered
by the Bank Merger Act,25 but his understanding of their application in
1960 must be remembered.
In his Philadelphia dissent, Justice Harlan correctly points out that
"the Bank Merger Act is almost completely nullified; its enactment turns
out to have been an exorbitant waste of congressional time and energy. ),20
Justice Harlan also presents a sound objection to the majority holding that
the 1950 Congress must have intended to include bank mergers within the
scope of the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 11 of the
Clayton Act gives the Federal Reserve Board authority to enforce section 7
where applicable to banks. This section has remained unchanged since 1914.
When Congress continued the Federal Reserve Board's section 11 authority
while literally limiting the asset acquisition provision of section 7 in the
1950 amendment to corporations subject to Federal Trade Commission
jurisdiction, it is certainly arguable that bank mergers were not included
within the scope of the amended section 7. 27
If the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Congress intended no
Clayton Act immunity for bank mergers is accepted, then the decision is not
surprising, for the federal banking agency decision under the Bank Merger
Act is a decision on the "public interest." In United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 28
 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Com-
mission's determination of public interest, convenience and necessity was not a
binding adjudication on the antitrust issues involved because the statute
under which the determination was made did not confer antitrust immunity
22 S. Rep. No. 196, supra note 12, at 3.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. at 1; see 106 Cong. Rec. 9710, 9711 (1960) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
25
 105 Cong. Rec. 8125, 8131 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
25
 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 6, at 384.
27 Id. at 395.
28 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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on the agency's decision. In California v. Federal Power Comm'n" and United
States v. El Paso Co.," a similar determination by the Federal Power Com-
mission received similar treatment when the statute involved did not contain
an express antitrust immunity. In his dissent to the El Paso Co. decision,
Justice Harlan notes that "this case affords another example of the unsatis-
factoriness of the existing bifurcated system of antitrust and other regulations
in various fields.""
Ir. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE Philadelphia DECISION
Regardless of the correctness of the Philadelphia decision, it has created
serious confusion on the subject of bank mergers. As of June 11, 1965, a
total of 765 bank mergers had been approved during the five years since the
enactment of the Bank Merger Act on May 13, 1960; bank mergers con-
summated during the ten years from 1950 to 1960 totaled 1,435.32 Since there
is no statute of limitations under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, all of these
mergers, as well as all future mergers, could be subjected to an antitrust
suit at the insistence of the Attorney General. However, it must be realized
that principles of fairness and consideration of the problems of divestiture
would most likely dissuade the Attorney General from bringing suits in most
of these cases, especially those most remote as to date of merger.
The problems of divestiture are illustrated by the three-year-old merger
of the First National Bank & Trust Company of Lexington and the Security
Trust Company which has been ordered split by the Supreme Court. 33 The
merged bank held 4,186 checking accounts and 4,051 savings accounts that
neither of the banks held before the merger. The merged bank holds 15 loans
which exceed $250,000. None of these loans can be assigned to the First
National because its legal lending limit was $250,000, and the deposit
structure which Security Trust will presumably have will not support a loan
of this size. The merged bank has been designated trustee of 83 trust accounts,
some of which are irrevocable: Can a federal court transplant trustees of
trusts within the jurisdiction of state probate courts? Key management
personnel are no longer with the merged bank. Stockholders of the merged
bank may not want shares in two smaller banks. Depositors may withdraw
accounts due to the air of illegality. 34
There is little doubt that legislation such as S. 1698 is needed, but S.
1698 would not clear up all the confusion that presently exists in the law
concerning bank mergers. The role that Section 11 of the Clayton Act should
play with regard to both the Bank Merger Act of 1960 and the proposed
amendment is uncertain. Section 11 gives the Federal Reserve Board the
authority to enforce section 7 when applicable to banks. It provides for a
full hearing with appeals to the circuit courts. This jurisdiction is not ex-
clusive,33
 but once the Board assumes jurisdiction of a case, it would seem
29
 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
8° 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
81 Id. at 663.
82
 S. Rep. No. 299, supra note 2, at 2-3.
88
 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S, 665 (1964).
34
 Hearings on S. 1698, supra note 3, at 56-57.
35
 United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 631 (1953).
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that the Board should proceed to final judgment in accordance with the pro-
cedures of section 11. In footnote treatment in the Philadelphia decision,
the Supreme Court expressed its belief that the Bank Merger Act of 1960
. . . plainly supplanted . . . whatever authority the FRB may have
acquired under § 11, by virtue of the amendment of § 7, to enforce
§ 7 against bank mergers. 36
Since the Comptroller was the agency involved, the issue was not fully faced
because there was no conflict between the Bank Merger Act and Section 11 of
the Clayton Act. In United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 37 when
the Federal Reserve Board was the agency approving a merger under the
Bank Merger Act, the district court felt that, although the Board had not
done so, it could have invoked jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Clayton
Act. The court uses this as a basis for invoking the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.38
The 1960 Congress did not consider section 11 because it believed that
section 7 did not apply to bank mergers; but whether section 11 will apply
to bank mergers and, if it does, how it will apply under the new legislation,
must be answered. It is doubtful that any Congress would intend one agency's
determination under the Bank Merger Act to have a different or more con-
clusive effect than that of another, but this is what may happen under the
present law and under S. 1698 as presently proposed. If the Federal Reserve
Board were to invoke its section 11 authority while considering a bank
merger and hold the required hearing prescribed in section 11, it could be
argued that any antitrust attack on the competitive factors once the Board had
approved the merger would have to follow the appeal procedures of section 11.
This would mean that, instead of pursuing a de novo hearing in the district
court, the Attorney General would have to appeal the Board's decision to
the circuit court where the Board's factfinding, if supported by substantial
evidence, would be conclusive. Until this possibility is handled legislatively,
it would be best to follow the Supreme Court's suggestion and assume that
any authority of the Federal Reserve Board over bank mergers under
Section 11 of the Clayton Act has been supplanted by the Bank Merger
Act. This solution will at least produce uniform procedure under the .Bank
Merger Act.
The Sherman Act was always considered applicable to bank mergers,
but it is possible that no one ever thought that it would be used against
them." In any event, the Sherman Act has figured in S. 1698. The original
version would have made the banking agency's determination conclusive on
Sherman as well as Clayton Act issues, and the present bill treats them both
as foreclosed after the thirty-day waiting period if no suit is brought within
that time. In the House Committee hearings on S. 1698, Attorney General
Katzenbach said the Department of Justice could cope with the thirty-day
36 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 6, at 344-45.
37 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
88
 Id. at 878-86.




limitation on the Clayton Act issues, but wished to retain Sherman Act
authority. It is evident from his remarks that he felt the proposed immunity
extended to future acts of the merged bank. His misunderstanding should have
been corrected by Senator Proxmire's remarks later in the week that im-
munity does not extend to future acts. 4° The Attorney General's remarks
would seem to indicate that the thirty-day waiting period will be sufficient.
As to the Attorney General's right to institute Sherman and Clayton suits
against future activities of the merged bank, there would seem to be little
objection to S. 1698 on this score.
III. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE
The principal issue in this area of the law is whether it is better to have
bank mergers subject to the narrow rule of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
or, alternatively, to have a group of banking experts decide whether or not
a proposed bank merger is in the public interest. There is some attraction
to the argument that the federal banking agencies have developed an ex-
pertise on banking and that through their constant communication and
contact with the banking industry, they know banks and bankers and the
necessities of the banking industry on a local and a national scale; that due
to this special knowledge of a complex industry, they are eminently better
qualified to make decisions on bank mergers with a view to what is best for
the United States than is a judge whose knowledge in the area may be limited
and whose hands are tied by narrow antitrust formulas designed to curb
business monopolies. This is the train of thought that runs through the com-
mittee testimony of the federal banking agencies. There is also merit in the
argument that the expanding American business world has a need for larger
banks with larger lending limits which cannot be adequately satisfied through
normal bank growth. It is rather certain that Section 7 of the Clayton Act will
not allow mergers to answer this need: Philadelphia clearly states that the
anticompetitive effects in one market (local) cannot be justified by pro-
competitive consequences in another (national). 41 The Senate report of the
Bank Merger Act lists additional examples of public interest mergers which
might not be allowed in certain circumstances under the rule of section 7:
1. Where there is a reasonable probability of the ultimate
failure of the bank to be acquired.
2. Where because of inadequate management the acquired
bank's future prospects are unfavorable.
3. Where the acquired bank has a problem with inadequate
capital or unsound assets and its acquisition by another bank would
be the best practical means of dealing with the problem.
4. Where the acquired bank has no adequate provision for
management succession or its management is incompetent.
5. Where the acquired bank. is an uneconomic unit or is too
small to meet the needs of its community by providing loans of suf-
ficient size or by providing needed banking facilities.
40 23 Cong. Q. 1784 (1965).
41 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 6, at 370.
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6. Where several banks in a small town are compelled by an
overbanked situation to resort to unsound competitive practices
which may eventually have an adverse effect upon the condition of
such banks and the merger of the two or more banks would, there-
fore, be in the public interest. 42
These are weighty considerations which find little place in a Clayton 7
determination. However, small bankers are justifiably concerned about their
competitive situation should section 7 protection be removed.
The Independent Bankers Association of America has opposed all legis-
lation that would exclude Section 7 of the Clayton Act from the considera-
tion of bank mergers. It has pointed to the fact that while 765 mergers have
been approved under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, only 31 have been
denied; 48
 that while the Department of Justice has submitted 470 unfavor-
able reports to the three federal banking agencies, it has initiated only seven
antitrust suits; 44 that the availability of loans, the rates charged on loans and
the rates paid on savings are governed by competition's While some provi-
sion should be made for the small banker, it does not seem that the banking
industry as a whole should be subject to the narrow confines of Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act should remain as a protection for small
banking. If more protection is needed, Congress should develop a new test or
procedure for considering the competitive factor in bank mergers which is not
irrevocably tied to the case law under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The beneficial potential of banking agency expertise may not be realized
under the Bank Merger Act setup. When the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency reported the Bank Merger Act of 1960 to the Senate, it gave
particular attention to the fact that, in the interests of uniform standards, the
act required the deciding agency to obtain the views of the other two banking
agencies on the competitive factor. It said:
The committee considers this provision essential to the main-
tenance of the dual system of banking. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation must review applications with the same atti-
tude, and must give the same weight to the various banking and
competitive factors. The Comptroller must not be more lenient in
approving mergers, so as to attract merging State banks into the
national banking system. The Board and the FDIC likewise must
not be more lenient in approving mergers, so as to tempt national
banks to leave the national banking system. The State banking
system and the National banking system must develop and compete
with each other on their own merits, without pressure in either direc-
tion from the administration . . . [of the Bank Merger Act]."
42 S. Rep. No. 196, supra note 12, at 19-20.
43 Hearings on S. 1698, supra note 3, at 16.
44 Id. at 166.
45 Id. at 150.




In the same report, four members of the Committee included among their
supplemental views that:
There is a pronounced tendency in American life for the regulatory
bodies which are set up to protect the public to become influenced
and largely controlled by the very groups which they were created
to regulate. In this respect there is nothing sacrosanct about the
bank regulatory agencies. We are not certain how much attention
they will pay to the opinions of the Department of Justice. . . 47
It would appear that the uniform standards so necessary for the beneficial
operation of the Bank Merger Act scheme have not been attained. In the two
bank merger cases to reach final judgment,48 the Comptroller approved a
bank merger over the adverse reports of the other two banking agencies and
the Attorney General." If uniform standards are not obtainable under the
three-agency approach and if each agency is going to favor an increase in its
own position in the banking industry, the arguments based on desirable ex-
pertise must fall unless a workable administrative alternative can be developed.
IV. A PROPOSED LONG-TERM SOLUTION
It is submitted that the need for uniform standards which will meet
the needs of our growing economy without running the small banker out of
business requires a unitary decisional board which will give the banking
and competitive factors an honest, detached consideration. It is easier to
suggest such a board than to suggest its composition. The board might be
composed of a representative from each of the three federal banking agencies
and the Department of Justice under the chairmanship of a banking expert
who is not associated with any of the other agencies. The board would be
directed by statute to consider the six banking factors of the Bank Merger
Act plus the overall competitive effect of a proposed merger on the local and
the national market. The statute should indicate that the congressional in-
tent is to relieve bank mergers from the application of the Clayton Act while
at the same time directing the board to give careful consideration to the local
need for advantageous retail banking. The final decision would be a public
interest determination in which no one factor and no single market could
demand controlling weight.
Each member of the board except the chairman would be required to
present a report on the proposed merger, and the board would be required
to hold hearings. The board would also be required to report its findings and
the basis for these findings. There would be no appeal from the board's deci-
sion.
Each member's report would be prepared by the agency which he repre-
sents. The board would consider any conflicts among the views of the three
47 Id. at 26.
48
 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 33; United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 6.
49
 For a tabulation of bank merger approvals and disapprovals by the Comptroller
and their conformity with the advisory reports, see generally Hearings on S. 1698, supra
note 3, at 172 inserts.
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banking agencies and the Department of Justice and attempt to achieve an
intelligent compromise. Throughout the consideration of the proposed merger,
the board would have before it the Department of Justice's views on any anti-
competitive effect. This would be most helpful should the Department of
Justice believe that there is a Sherman Act issue involved. It is believed that
this procedure will be conducive to the development of uniform workable
standards in the field of bank mergers. The effect of any interagency com-
petition for new banks would be reduced. The narrow rule of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act would be avoided, while the broader rule of the Sherman
Act would still apply. The weakest point in this suggestion is that the board
would be forced to develop a new antitrust criteria.
V. SENATE BILL 1698: A PARTIAL SOLUTION
The second part of S. 1698 is an attempt to save the 2,200 bank
mergers that have been consummated since the 1950 amendment of Section 7
of the Clayton Act from the difficult if not impossible problems of divesti-
ture. It is submitted that such special legislation is an absolute necessity with
regard to most of the banks affected. Equity requires that those banks which
merged in the honest belief that all that was required was the appropriate
agency approval should not be retroactively penalized. However, the equities
may not be so decidedly in the favor of some of the more recent bank mergers
which were consummated after the Philadelphia antitrust suit. Representative
Todd has introduced six bills50 with each bill asking relief for a single recent
bank merger. It is Representative Todd's hope that a separate consideration
of the equities in each case will result in fairer treatment for all six mergers
and relieve some of the opposition to S. 1698.
Senate bill 1698 does not provide what the field of bank merger law re-
quires. It has abandoned the original purpose of the Bank Merger Act of 1960,
which was to leave the decision on bank mergers to the expertise of the fed-
eral banking agencies. It accepts the Philadelphia decision and allows Section
7 of the Clayton Act to have absolute and final control over proposed bank
mergers. However, the bill will clear up the present confusion by providing a
procedure which will give finality to an approved bank merger. It is sub-
mitted that this is sufficient reason to pass the bill, but bank merger legisla-
tion should not end with the enactment of S. 1698. Congress should devise
a bill which will revest a group of expert banking administrators with a
substantial voice in bank mergers and which will allow a merger that is
needed and procompetitive in the national market even though it may tend
to lessen competition in the local market.
The First Session of the 89th Congress ended before any proposed amend-
ment to the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was presented to the House. If such
a bill is presented during the Second Session commencing in January 1966,
it is possible that it will be substantially different from S. 1698 as it passed
the Senate. On October 19, 1965, the House subcommittee which was con-
sidering S. 1698, in a doubtfully legal session called without the approval of
GO H.R. 10846-52, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 Cong. Rec. 21717-18, 21726
(daily ed. Sept. 1, 1965).
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the chairman, Representative Patman, approved a substitute bill submitted
by Representative Ashley which would change the effect of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as applied to bank mergers by requiring the courts to decide
whether a merger's possible anticompetitive effect is outweighed by its bene-
fits to the local community and to the financial health of the merged banks. 51
The legality of this committee action is now before the House Rules Commit-
tee on the objection of Chairman Patman, who favors a bill which would con-
tinue to subject bank mergers to the full effect of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act 52
The Ashley bill is commendable in so far as it attempts to relieve bank
mergers from the case law under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, but it is sub-
mitted that the federal banking agencies or a federal banking board as out-
lined above—and not the courts—should be given the authority to approve
or disapprove bank mergers on the basis of both banking and competitive
factors. Expert banking administrators are better suited to this determina-
tion than is a judge. The Ashley bill would provide a starting point for dis-
cussion on additional legislation on bank mergers, but its passage by the
House at this time would cause harmful delay in the enactment of legislation
to relieve the present confusion on bank mergers, for it would no doubt
necessitate long debate and committee hearings in the Senate. Prompt clari-
fying legislation is presently needed, and S. 1698 will meet this need.
GEORGE W. BROWN
51
 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1965, p. 5, col. 2.
52
 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1965, p. 3, col. 2.
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